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Abstract—This paper studies resilient multi-agent distributed
estimation of an unknown vector parameter when a subset
of the agents is adversarial. We present and analyze a Flag
Raising Distributed Estimator (FRDE) that allows the agents
under attack to perform accurate parameter estimation and
detect the adversarial agents. The FRDE algorithm is a con-
sensus+innovations estimator in which agents combine estimates
of neighboring agents (consensus) with local sensing information
(innovations). We establish that, under FRDE , either the uncom-
promised agents’ estimates are almost surely consistent or the
uncompromised agents detect compromised agents if and only if
the network of uncompromised agents is connected and globally
observable. Numerical examples illustrate the performance of
FRDE .
Index Terms—Resilient parameter estimation, Consensus +
Innovations, Cyber-physical security, Multi-agent networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed algorithms arise in numerous applications such
as consensus algorithms [1], [2], inference and computation
over wireless networks [3]–[8], state estimation in the electric
power grid [9], and control of multi-agent systems [10], [11].
In these applications, individual agents exchange information
with their neighbors to compute the average of a set of
initial agent values [1], [2] or to rendezvous at a common
location [11].
Distributed algorithms are vulnerable to attack from ad-
versarial agents. The presence of compromised agents can
prevent a distributed algorithm from achieving its desired goal.
For example, one popular algorithm for distributed parameter
estimation is the Diffusion Least Mean Squares (DLMS) al-
gorithm [8]. In the DLMS algorithm, like in other general dis-
tributed estimation methods, the presence of adversarial agents
can prevent the other agents from correctly estimating the
parameter of interest [12]. References [12] and [13] propose
a distributed technique, coupled with diffusion adaptation, to
detect and counteract adversarial agents who behave as though
they observe a different parameter than the true parameter of
interest. The modifications presented in [12] and [13] address
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a specific type of adversarial behavior, but, in general, there
are many other types of attacks.
This paper addresses the following question: how can
normally behaving agents estimate an unknown parameter in
the presence of adversarial agents? Consider a network of
agents, each making local sensor measurements of an unknown
parameter θ∗. While the agents have enough information,
collectively, to determine θ∗ (i.e., agent models are globally
observable), no individual agent has enough information by
itself to determine θ∗ (i.e., agent models are locally unob-
servable).1 The agents exchange information with their direct
neighbors to perform estimation. In this paper, we propose
a method for agents to either detect adversaries or achieve
resilient distributed estimation. In other words, we establish a
necessary and sufficient condition such that, either, the attack
is weak to escape detection (with false alarm probability below
a desired level), in which case our algorithm is resilient and
the estimates converge almost surely to θ∗, or, the attack is
strong, in which it is detected.
A. Literature Review
An important example that demonstrates the effect of mis-
behaving agents in distributed computation is the Byzantine
Generals Problem [14] where a group of agents must decide,
by passing messages between one another (in an all-to-all
manner), whether or not to attack an enemy city. Adversarial
agents attempt to disrupt the message passing process and
cause the group to reach the incorrect decision. The authors
of [14] show that, if the number of adversarial agents is at least
one third of the number of all agents, then it is impossible to
design any distributed algorithm (under the specified admissi-
ble class of message passing protocols) to compute the correct
decision. Conversely, if the number of adversarial agents is
less than one third of the number of all agents, they provide
an algorithm for the non-adversarial agents to reach the correct
decision even in the presence of adversaries. Reference [14]
addresses consensus (i.e., agreeing on a decision whether
or not to attack) in an all-to-all communication setting. In
contrast, this paper studies distributed estimation in a sparse
communication setting (i.e., agents may only communicate
with their neighbors).
Existing work has addressed Byzantine attacks in the con-
text of decentralized inference [15]–[18], where individual
agents make measurements of an unknown parameter and send
their measurements to a fusion center. A fraction of the agents
1In contrast, DLMS ( [8], [12], [13]) require agent models to be locally
observable.
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2may be Byzantine agents that send arbitrary measurements
to the fusion center, and the goal of the fusion center is to
correctly infer the value of the unknown parameter even in
the presence of Byzantine agents. In contrast to [15]–[18],
this paper studies fully distributed estimation: our setup does
not use a fusion center.
Our previous work studies attacks against centralized cyber-
physical systems – we address the impact of information on
detecting attacks [19] and develop optimal attack strategies
for adversaries [20], [21]. Existing work in cyber-physical
security also examines large-scale networked systems. Ref-
erence [22] provides examples of centralized cyber-physical
attacks against power grids. Unlike [19]–[22], this paper
studies resilience in a distributed setup instead of a centralized
setup.
For fully distributed resilient algorithms, i.e., algorithms that
do not depend on a fusion center, prior work has focused
on average consensus [23]–[25], fault detection in control
systems [26], and general function computation [27]. In [23]
and [24], the authors consider the average consensus problem
for scalar values in the presence of misbehaving agents. The
authors provide iterative distributed consensus algorithms in
which, during each iteration, agents ignore a subset of mes-
sages received from their neighbors. Reference [24] provides
necessary and sufficient conditions, based on the number
of adversarial agents and the topology of the inter-agent
communication network, under which non-adversarial agents
achieve consensus. The algorithms proposed in [23] and [24]
require each agent to have only local knowledge of the network
topology, i.e., each agent needs to know its own neighbors in
the network but does not need to know the entire network
structure.
Reference [25] provides another method of dealing with
adversarial agents in distributed consensus. The authors of [25]
construct fault detection and identification (FDI) filters for
distributed consensus by leveraging knowledge of the net-
work structure and algorithm dynamics (i.e., the process by
which individual agents update their estimates and exchange
information with neighbors). Unlike the methods of [23]
and [24], the FDI filters proposed in [25] depend on agents
having knowledge of the entire network structure. Similarly,
the authors of [26] study distributed fault detection filters
for interconnected dynamical systems (i.e., filters to detect
whether or not a perturbing control signal has been applied
to the system) that also depend on agents having knowledge
of the entire network structure.
When individual agents know the network structure, ref-
erence [27] goes beyond average consensus and provides
algorithms to calculate arbitrary functions of the agents’ initial
values in the presence of adversaries. In general, the resilience
of the algorithms presented in [23]–[27] to adversarial agents
depends on the topology of the inter-agent communication
network. In this paper, we study distributed estimation instead
of distributed consensus2 (like in [23]–[27]), and we propose
an algorithm that does not require individual agents to know
2We emphasize that, with distributed estimation, the agents make new
measurements at every time instant, which contrasts with consensus where the
data available is only the initial data, and no new measurements are available.
the entire network structure (unlike the algorithms presented
in [25]–[27]).
B. Summary of Contributions
In contrast with previous work on consensus, where no ob-
servations are involved, this paper studies resilient distributed
estimation, where, at each time step, agents make their own
observations, update their estimates, and exchange information
with their neighbors. Reference [28] also considers attack
resilient distributed parameter estimation, in which a group of
agents attempt to estimate a scalar parameter subject to some
agents acting maliciously. In [28], some agents have perfect
information and know the value of the parameter before the
estimation process, while other agents know a noisy version
of the parameter. In this paper, unlike in [28], no agent knows
the value of the parameter before the estimation process.
We develop the Flag Raising Distributed Estimation
(FRDE) algorithm that simultaneously performs adversary
detection and parameter estimation. The FRDE algorithm
is a consensus+innovations estimator (see [5]). In each it-
eration of FRDE , each (normally-behaving) agent, to per-
form parameter estimation, updates its estimate based on its
previous estimate, its sensor measurement (innovations), and
the estimates of its neighbors (consensus), and, to perform
adversary detection, checks the Euclidean distance between
its own estimate and the estimates of its neighbors, reporting
that an attack has occurred if the distance exceeds a certain
(adaptive) threshold.
Under the FRDE algorithm, if the network of normally-
behaving agents is connected and the concatenation of their
observations is globally observable3, then, either, the normally
behaving agents will either asymptotically detect the presence
of adversarial agents or their local estimates will be almost
surely (a.s.) consistent (converge to true parameter value with
probability one). That is, a set of adversarial agents that mask
their presence in order not to alert others to their attack
cannot simultaneously prevent the normally behaving agents’
estimates from converging to the true value of the parameter.
The key necessary and sufficient condition is global observ-
ability of the connected normally behaving agents. As long
as this condition holds, consistency is almost surely guaran-
teed. Conversely, if the normally-behaving agents lack global
observability, then, it is possible for adversarial agents to
disrupt the estimation algorithm while simultaneously avoiding
detection.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we review background from spectral graph theory, present
the sensing and communication model for the network of
agents, and state the assumptions regarding adversarial agents.
Section III describes the FRDE algorithm, and Section IV
analyzes its resilience to adversarial agents. We find an upper
bound on the false alarm probability of the algorithm. The
probability of missed detection depends on the behavior of
the adversarial agents. When normally behaving agents lack
global observability, adversarial agents may simultaneously
evade detection and prevent local estimates from converging to
3We formally define global observability in Section II.
3the parameter. When normally behaving agents are connected
and globally observable, then, they will either asymptotically
detect the adversarial agents, or, in the case of no attack
detection, their estimates will be a.s. consistent. We provide
numerical examples of the FRDE algorithm in Section V and
conclude in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Notation
Let Rk denote the k dimensional Euclidean space, Ik the k
by k identity matrix, 1k and 0k the column vectors of ones and
zeros in Rk, respectively. The operator ‖·‖ is the Euclidean `2
norm when applied to vectors and the corresponding induced
norm when applied to matrices. For a matrix M , let N (M)
be its null space and M† its Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse.
The Kronecker product of A and B is A ⊗ B. M  0 or
M  0 denotes that M is positive semidefinite or positive
definite, respectively.
Below, we consider a network of N agents defined by a
communication graph G. An undirected graph is noted as G =
(V,E), where V = {1, . . . , N} is the set of vertices and
E = {(n, l)| ∃ an edge between vertex n and vertex l}
is the set of edges. We consider only simple graphs, i.e., no
self loops nor multiple edges. The neighborhood of a vertex
n is
Ωn = {l ∈ V |(n, l) ∈ E} .
The degree of a vertex is dn = |Ωn|. The degree matrix of G
is D = diag (d1, . . . , dN ). The structure of G is described by
the symmetric adjacency matrix A = [Anl], where Anl = 1 if
(n, l) ∈ E and Anl = 0, otherwise. The positive semidefinite
matrix L = D−A is the graph Laplacian. The eigenvalues of
L can be ordered as 0 = λ1(L) ≤ . . . ≤ λN (L), and 1N is
the eigenvector associated with λ1(L). For a connected graph
G, λ2(L) > 0. For further details on spectral graph theory,
see [29], [30].
For a subset of vertices X = {i1, . . . , i|X |} ⊂ V , let GX =
(X , EX ), where
EX = {(n, l) ∈ E|n ∈ X and l ∈ X} ,
is the subgraph induced by X . We say that a subset of vertices
X is connected if GX is connected. Let LX denote the Lapla-
cian of GX . For a vertex n ∈ X and for a subset of vertices
Y disjoint from X , let σn,Y = |Ωn ∩ Y| denote the number of
neighbors of n in Y . Let ΣX ,Y = diag
(
σi1,Y , . . . , σi|X|,Y
)
.
In this paper, we assume that all random objects are defined
on a common probability space (Ω,F). Let P (·) and E [·]
denote the probability and expectation operators, respectively.
The abbreviation a.s. means “almost surely,” i.e., everywhere
except on a set of measure 0. In this paper, consistency of a
estimator refers to strong consistency: a consistent estimator
produces a sequence of estimates that converges a.s. to the
parameter of interest.
B. Sensing and Communication Model
Consider a network of N agents (or nodes) defined by
a communication graph G = (V,E). Let θ∗ ∈ RM be a
deterministic (distributed) unknown parameter that is to be
estimated by the N agents. Agent n makes a measurement
yn(t) = Hnθ
∗ + wn(t). (1)
For example, in power grid state estimation, θ∗ represents
the voltages and phase angles at all of the buses in the
network. The Hn matrices model local sensing. Again, in
power grid state estimation, the Hn model sensors measuring
local voltages and phase angles at each of the buses [9].
We make the following assumptions about the measurement
noise term wn(t) and the measurement matrix Hn.
Assumption 1. At each agent n, the measurement noise wn(t)
is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time t
with mean E [wn(t)] = 0 and covariance E
[
wn(t)wn(t)
T
]
=
Σn. Across agents, the measurement noise is independent, i.e.,
wj(t) and wk(s) are independently distributed for j 6= k and
for all s, t.
For agent n, let ψn = trace (Σn).
Assumption 2. At each agent n, the measurement matrix Hn
satisfies
λmax
(
HTnHn
) ≤ 1. (2)
Assumption 2 is without loss of generality, since, if, for
some n, λmax
(
HTnHn
)
> 1, then appropriately scaling the
measurement, i.e., yn(t) = cn (Hnθ∗ + wn(t)), we can get
λmax
(
c2nH
T
nHn
) ≤ 1.
The goal of the network of agents is to recursively es-
timate θ∗ from the individual observations y1(t), . . . , yN (t),
t = 0, 1, . . . , subject to the assumptions stated below.
Assumption 3. The graph G is connected.
If G is not connected, then we can separately consider each
connected component of G.
Specification 1. Agent n knows only its own local sensing
model (i.e., each agent knows only its own Hn), its neighbor-
hood Ωn, and its local observation yn(t).
Specification 2. Agent n exchanges information only with
other agents in Ωn.
Definition 1. Let X = {n1, . . . , n|X |} be a subset of (con-
nected) agents (X ⊆ V ) and GX its induced subgraph. We say
that GX is globally observable if the matrix
∑
n∈X H
T
nHn is
invertible.
Global observability is a necessary condition for a centralized
estimator to be consistent. So, it is natural to assume it for
distributed estimation (e.g., [4]) as we state next.
Assumption 4. The graph of all agents, G, is globally
observable.
The individual agents are not assumed to be locally observable,
i.e., Hn may have low column rank.
4Assumption 5. The parameter θ∗ belongs to a non-empty
compact set Θ, where
Θ =
{
θ ∈ RM |‖θ‖ ≤ η} . (3)
Each agent n knows the value of η.
In practical settings for distributed parameter estimation, such
as distributed state estimation in the power grid [9] and
temperature estimation over wireless sensor networks [4], the
parameter to be estimated does not take an arbitrary value but
rather takes a value from a closed, bounded set determined by
physical laws.
C. Threat Model
The agents use an iterative distributed message-passing
protocol, to be specified shortly, to estimate the parameter
θ∗. Some agents in the network are adversarial and attempt
to disrupt the estimation procedure. We partition the set of all
agents V into a set of adversarial agents A and a set of normal
agents N = V \A. Agent n is adversarial, n ∈ A, if, for some
t = 0, 1, . . . , it deviates from the distributed protocol (to be
introduced soon). Our goal in this paper is to develop secure
protocols for distributed parameter estimation.
Specification 3. The adversarial agents know the structure of
G, the true value of the parameter θ∗, the members of the sets
A and N , may communicate with all other adversarial agents
to launch powerful attacks, and send arbitrary messages to
their neighbors.
Normally behaving agents, n ∈ N , do not initially know
whether other agents are normally behaving or adversarial.
That is, the agents n ∈ N do not know the members of N
and A.
Our attack model differs from the model presented in [12],
[13]. In these references, the adversarial agents act as though
they observe a different parameter than the true parameter θ∗
and share this distorted information with their neighbors. The
intruders are not required to know the true parameter or the
size of the network. In our paper, the adversarial agents know
the true parameter and the size of the network and may send
different messages to each of its neighbors. It is in this sense,
that ours is a worst-case scenario of adversarial agents. Our
attack model includes the attack described in [12], [13], i.e.
in this paper, adversarial agents may attack the network by
acting as though they observe a different parameter than θ∗,
but they are not required to attack in this particular way.
For the purpose of analysis, only, we make the following
assumptions regarding the sets of normally-behaving and ad-
versarial agents.
Assumption 6. The induced subgraph GN of the normally
behaving agents is connected.
In practice, Assumption 6 may not be true; adversarial agents
may split the normally behaving agents into several connected
components. In such a situation, our analysis applies to each
connected component of normally behaving agents. For the
remainder of this paper, unless otherwise stated, we make
Assumption 6.
III. DISTRIBUTED ESTIMATION AND ADVERSARY
DETECTION
In this section, we present the Flag Raising Distributed
Estimation (FRDE) algorithm, under which agents simultane-
ously perform parameter estimation and adversary detection.
A. FRDE Algorithm
Each iteration of FRDE follows three main steps: 1) Mes-
sage Passing, 2) Estimate Update, and 3) Adversary Detection.
At each t = 0, 1, . . . , each agent n computes an estimate xn(t)
of the parameter θ∗ and a flag value pin(t). The flag pin(t)
takes values of either “Attack” or “No Attack,” depending
if agent n detects an attack. We say that the distributed
algorithm has detected an adversarial agent if for some t and
n, pin(t) = Attack, and we say that the distributed algorithm
has not detected an adversarial agent if for all t and all n,
pin(t) = No Attack.4 The flag pin(t) = “Attack” indicates that
there exists an adversarial agent in the network but does not
identify which agent(s) is (are) adversarial.
We initialize the FRDE algorithm as follows. At time t =
0, each agent n ∈ N sets its estimate as
xn(0) = 0, (4)
and its initial flag value as
pin(0) = No Attack. (5)
Note that, as a result of (4), all of the initial estimates of
normally behaving agents n satisfy xn(0) ∈ Θ.
Message Passing: For all t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , the normally
behaving agents n ∈ N follow the message generation rule
mtn,l = xn(t), (6)
and send mtn,l to each of its neighbors.
Estimate Update: Each agent maintains a running average
of its local measurement
yn(t) =
t
t+ 1
yn(t− 1) +
1
t+ 1
yn(t),
yn(0) = yn(0).
(7)
Note that
yn(t) = Hnθ
∗ +
1
t+ 1
t∑
j=0
wn(j). (8)
Agent n ∈ N follows the consensus+innovations estimation
update rule
xn(t+ 1) =xn(t)− β
∑
l∈Ωn
(
xn(t)−mtl,n
)
+ αHTn (yn(t)−Hnxn(t)) ,
(9)
where α and β are positive constants to be specified shortly.
Adversary Detection: Agent n ∈ N updates its flag by the
rule
pin(t+1) =

Attack, pin(t) = Attack, or
∃l,
∥∥∥xn(t)−mtl,n∥∥∥ > γt
No Attack, Otherwise
, (10)
4By Assumption 6, GN is connected, so, once a single agent n ∈ N
detects an attack, it communicates this detection to all other agents in N .
5where γt is a time-varying parameter to be specified shortly.
We assume that no adversarial agent purposefully reports an
attack (i.e., for all n ∈ A, and for all t, pin(t) = No Attack),
since the adversarial agents want to avoid being detected. The
threshold parameter γt follows the recursion
γt+1 = (1− r1) γt + α 2K
(t+ 1)τ
,
γ0 = 2η
√
N,
(11)
where K > 0, 0 < τ < 12 , and 0 < r1 ≤ 1 are parameters to
be specified shortly. We describe how to select parameters α,
β, r1, K, and τ in Section III-B. We require α, β, and r1 to
satisfy the following conditions:
λmax (Jβ,α) ≤ 1, (12)
0 < r1 ≤ λmin (Jβ,α) , (13)
where Jβ,α = β (L⊗ IM ) + αDTHDH , DH =
blkdiag (H1, . . . ,HN ), and we recall M is the dimension
of θ∗.
Intuitively, the definition of γt in (11) and conditions (12)
and (13) relate to the performance of FRDE as follows.
Following (11), the threshold γt decays over time. If we
choose parameters to satisfy (12) and (13), then, in the absence
of adversaries, the local estimation error decays in a manner
similar to the threshold γt. Moreover, in the absence of
adversaries, the Euclidean distance between any agent’s local
estimate and any of its received messages is upper bounded by
a constant factor times the local estimation error. Thus, if this
upper bound is ever violated, i.e., if the Euclidean distance
between the local estimate and any received message exceeds
the threshold, the agent reports the presence of an adversary.
We provide details on how conditions (12) and (13) relate to
the performance of FRDE in Section IV.
The estimate update rule in (9) is exactly the same as the
distributed parameter estimation algorithm provided in [9],
and, if there are no adversarial nodes, the distributed algorithm
described in this paper behaves exactly as the distributed
algorithm provided in [9].5 Here, we emphasize that our main
contributions are the distributed attack detection update de-
scribed by equations (10) and (11) and the analysis of FRDE
under adversarial activities. Unlike the existing literature [3],
[4], [9] on consensus+innovation parameter estimation, which
assumes all agents behave normally, our attack detection
method allows the distributed parameter estimation method
to operate even in the presence of adversarial agents. For
DLMS algorithms, references [12] and [13] study the effect
of adversarial agents who behave as though they observe a
different parameter than the true parameter.
B. Parameter Selection
This subsection describes how to select parameters
α, β, r1,K and τ . for the FRDE algorithm. Parameters K
and τ may take any values that satisfy K > 0 and 0 < τ < 12 .
Section IV describes how the choices of K and τ affect the
5In [9], the step sizes α and β decay over time to cope with measurement
noise. This paper considers constant α and β.
performance of the algorithm. We describe two procedures
to select the parameters α, β, and r1. We assume that, during
the setup phase of FRDE (for parameter selection), all agents
behave normally.
Procedure 1 requires centralized knowledge of the entire
network structure and all sensing matrices H1, . . . ,HN during
the setup phase of FRDE . Once the parameters α, β, and r1
are chosen, besides these three parameters, individual agents
only need local information (its own measurement and the
messages of its neighbors) to execute the FRDE algorithm.
They do not need to know the structure of the entire network
and the sensing matrices of the other agents. Procedure 2
describes how to select parameters knowing only that the net-
work G is connected (Assumption 3) and globally observable
(Assumption 4). That is, Procedure 2 does not require exact
knowledge of the network structure and sensing matrices.
We now establish that Procedures 1 and 2 satisfy (12)
and (13). We start with the following Lemma
Lemma 1. For any α, β > 0, the matrix Jβ,α = β (L⊗ IM )+
αDTHDH is positive definite.
The proof of Lemma 1 is found in the appendix. The first
procedure is as follows.
Procedure 1:
1) Choose auxiliary parameters α̂ and β̂ to be positive.
2) Set
α =
α̂
λmax
(
Jβ̂,α̂
) , β = β̂
λmax
(
Jβ̂,α̂
) . (14)
3) Set r1 = λmin (Jβ,α) .
Lemma 2. The parameters α, β, and r1 selected using Pro-
cedure 1 lead to λmax (Jβ,α) ≤ 1 and 0 < r1 ≤ λmin (Jβ,α).
The proof of Lemma 2 is found in the appendix. Comput-
ing λmax
(
Jβ̂,α̂
)
in (14) requires knowledge of the network
structure (the graph Laplacian, L) and all sensing matrices (the
matrix DTHDH ).
Knowledge of the network structure and all sensing matrices
is a design cost associated with Procedure 1. Individual agents,
however, do not need to know or store the network structure
and sensing matrices; they only need to store the scalar
parameters α, β, and r1 to perform FRDE . We can compute
these parameters separately in the cloud and broadcast them
to the agents, so that no agent needs to know the graph G
or the Hn of other agents. Moreover, in practice, the network
structure and sensing matrices are sparse. For example, in a
wireless temperature sensor network, where θ∗ represents a
temperature field, every sensor measures a single component
of θ∗, and the resulting Hn matrices are sparse (each Hn
matrix has exactly one nonzero component). The sparsity of
the network and Hn matrices means that this information
can be efficiently shared amongst all of the agents, which, in
practice, reduces the design cost associated with Procedure 1.
We present a second procedure that only requires knowledge
of λmax(L), the second smallest eigenvalue, λ2(L), of the
graph Laplacian L, and the minimum eigenvalue of the matrix
G = 1N
∑N
n=1H
T
nHn.
6Procedure 2:
1) Choose κ1 > 1λ2(L)
(
λmin(G) + 2
√
4− λmin(G)
)
.
2) Set α = (κ1λmax (L) +N)
−1.
3) Set β = ακ1.
4) Set r1 = α
(
λmin(G)− 4λmin(G)√
4λmin(G)−(λmin(G)−λ2(L)κ1)2
)
.
If we do not know λmax(L) and λ2(L), we can use bounds
for these quantities that depend only on the number of agents
N [31]. In particular, in steps 1) and 4), we can replace λ2(L)
with the lower bound λ2(L) ≥ 4N2 , and, in step 2), we can
replace λmax(L) with the upper bound λmax(L) ≤ N .
Lemma 3. The parameters α, β, and r1 selected using Pro-
cedure 2 lead to λmax (Jβ,α) ≤ 1 and 0 < r1 ≤ λmin (Jβ,α).
The proof of Lemma 3 is found in the appendix.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF FRDE
This section studies the performance of the FRDE al-
gorithm and its resilience to adversarial agents. Under the
FRDE algorithm, normally behaving agents will either
achieve a.s. consistency in their local estimates or they will
asymptotically report the presence of adversaries. The nec-
essary and sufficient condition for this performance is the
global observability of the (connected) network of normally
behaving agents. In the case that all agents behave normally
(i.e., no adversaries), we show that the probability of any agent
incorrectly reporting an adversary can be made arbitrarily
small. That is, we find an upper bound for the algorithm’s
probability of false alarm.
Let xt =
[
x1(t)
T · · · xN (t)T
]T
, and define the
global estimation error
et = xt − (1N ⊗ θ∗) . (15)
We study the behavior of et and of the flag variable pin(t)
over time. In this section, we assume the parameters α, β, and
r1 are chosen to satisfy (12) and (13).
A. Performance with No Adversarial Agents
We find an upper bound for the false alarm probability of
FRDE (i.e., the probability that FRDE declares that there is
an adversarial agent under the scenario that all agents behave
normally) and analyze the behavior of local estimates xn(t)
when there are no adversarial agents.
Theorem 1. If there are no adversarial agents (A = ∅), then,
under the FRDE algorithm, for all n ∈ V , we have
P
(
lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
τ0 ‖xn(t)− θ∗‖ = 0
)
= 1, (16)
for every 0 ≤ τ0 < 12 . Moreover, the false alarm probability,
PFA, satisfies
PFA = P (∃n ∈ V, t ≥ 0 : pin(t) = Attack) ≤ Ψζ(τ)
K2
, (17)
where Ψ =
∑N
n=1 trace (Σn) and ζ(τ) =
∑∞
j=1
1
j2(1−τ) .
Theorem 1 states that, in the absence of adversaries, local
estimates are strongly consistent, converging almost surely to
θ∗. Equation (17) bounds the probability that any agent n at
any time t ≥ 0 raises an alarm flag. Therefore, (17) bounds
the false alarm probability of FRDE .
To decrease the false alarm probability, one should choose
larger values of the parameter K and smaller values of the
parameter τ . For any 0 < τ < 12 , we can make the false alarm
probability arbitrarily small by choosing large enough K. The
upper bound provided by (17) is conservative. To achieve a low
false alarm rate in practice, we may not need as large a value
of K as dictated by (17). We illustrate the difference between
the upper bound on false alarm probability and the algorithm’s
empirical false alarm rate through numerical examples in
Section V. Choosing larger K and smaller τ results in the
threshold γt decaying more slowly (i.e., larger γt). Having a
larger γt allows the adversarial agents to send more malicious
messages (messages that deviate more from true parameter)
while evading detection. We illustrate the trade off between
the false alarm probability and the magnitude of the threshold
γt through numerical examples in Section V.
The proof of Theorem 1 requires several intermediate re-
sults. We will use the following lemma to determine the effect
of measurement noise on the estimation process.
Lemma 4 (Lemma 5 in [3]). Consider the scalar, time varying
system
vt+1 = (1− p1(t)) vt + p2(t), (18)
where
p1(t) =
c1
(t+ 1)δ1
, p2(t) =
c2
(t+ 1)δ2
, (19)
c1, c2 > 0, 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ 1, and δ2 ≥ 0. If δ1 < 1 and δ2 > δ1,
we have
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
δ0vt = 0, (20)
for every 0 ≤ δ0 < δ2− δ1. If δ1 = 1 and δ2 > δ1, (20) holds
if, in addition, δ0 < c1.
The proof of Lemma 4 may be found in [3] and [5].
The following result characterizes the behavior of time-
averaged measurement noise.
Lemma 5. Let w0, w1, w2, . . . be i.i.d. (vector) random vari-
ables with mean E [wt] = 0 and finite covariance E
[
wtw
T
t
]
=
Σ. Define mt as the mean of w0, . . . , wt, i.e.,
mt =
1
t+ 1
t∑
j=0
wj . (21)
Then, we have
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ0 ‖mt‖ = 0
)
= 1, (22)
P
(
sup
t≥0
‖mt‖ > K
(t+ 1)τ0
)
≤ trace (Σ) ζ(τ0)
K2
, (23)
for 0 ≤ τ0 < 12 , where ζ(τ0) =
∑∞
j=1
1
j2(1−τ0) .
The proof of Lemma 5 may be found in the appendix.
We now prove Theorem 1.
Proof (Theorem 1): First, we study the a.s. convergence
of the estimates and prove (16). Let
yt =
[
y1(t)
T · · · yN (t)T
]T
,
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wt =
[
w1(t)
T · · · wN (t)T
]T
,
where wn(t) = 1t+1
∑t
j=0 wj . From (9), we have
xt+1 = xt − β (L⊗ IM )xt + αDTH (yt −DHxt) . (24)
Performing algebraic manipulation and noting, from (1), that
DTHyt = D
T
HDH (1N ⊗ θ∗) +DTHwt,
we have
xt+1 = (INM − Jβ,α)xt + Jβ,α (1N ⊗ θ∗) +αDTHwt, (25)
where (25) follows from (24) because, from the properties of
L, we have (L⊗ IM ) (1N ⊗ θ∗) = 0.
From (25), we have that the dynamics of et are
et+1 = (INM − Jβ,α) et + αDTHwt. (26)
Conditions (12) and (13) state that λmax (Jβ,α) ≤ 1 and
λmin (Jβ,α) > 0. Thus the matrix INM − Jβ,α is positive
semi-definite with
λmax (INM − Jβ,α) = 1− λmin (Jβ,α) < 1. (27)
By Assumption 2, we have λmax
(
HTnHn
) ≤ 1, which
means that
∥∥DTH∥∥ ≤ 1. Since ‖INM − Jβ,α‖ =
λmax (INM − Jβ,α) < 1, we have, from (26), that
‖et+1‖ ≤ ‖INM − Jβ,α‖ ‖et‖+ α
∥∥DTHwt∥∥ (28)
≤ (1− λmin (Jβ,α)) ‖et‖+ α ‖wt‖ . (29)
By construction, wt falls under the purview of Lemma 5,
which means that
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ1 ‖wt‖ = 0
)
= 1, (30)
for every 0 ≤ τ1 < 12 . As a consequence of (30), there exists
finite Kw such that
P
(
‖wt‖ ≤ Kw
(t+ 1)τ1
)
= 1, (31)
for every 0 ≤ τ1 < 12 . Thus, almost surely, we have, from (29),
‖et+1‖ ≤ (1− λmin (Jβ,α)) ‖et‖+ αKw
(t+ 1)τ1
. (32)
The relationship above falls under the purview of Lemma 4,
which means that we have
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ0 ‖et‖ = 0
)
= 1, (33)
for all 0 ≤ τ0 < τ1. Since ‖xn(t)− θ∗‖ ≤ ‖et‖, by taking τ1
arbitrarily close to 12 , equation (33) establishes (16).
Second, we bound the false alarm probability of FRDE .
The FRDE algorithm raises a false alarm if, in the absence
of adversaries, for any t ≥ 0, any n ∈ V , and any l ∈ Ωn,
we have ‖xn(t)− xl(t)‖ > γt. By the triangle inequality, we
have
‖xn(t)− xl(t)‖ ≤ ‖xn(t)− θ∗‖+ ‖xl(t)− θ∗‖ , (34)
≤ 2 ‖et‖ . (35)
Thus, if there is a false alarm, then, necessarily, for some
t ≥ 0, ‖et‖ > γt2 . We find an upper bound on the probability
that ‖et‖ > γt2 .
As an intermediate step, recall, from above, that wt falls
under the purview of Lemma 5. Thus, for any K > 0, 0 ≤
τ < 12 , we have
P
(
sup
t≥0
‖wt‖ > K
(t+ 1)τ
)
≤ Ψζ(τ)
K2
, (36)
where Ψ =
∑N
n=1 trace (Σn) and ζ(τ) =
∑∞
j=1
1
j2(1−τ) .
Consider the set of sample paths{
ω ∈ Ω : sup
t≥0
‖wt‖ ≤ K
(t+ 1)τ
}
. (37)
By (36), such a set has probability greater than 1− Ψζ(τ)K2 , and
we use induction to show that, on this set, ‖et‖ ≤ γt2 for all
t ≥ 0.
In the base case, for t = 0, since xn(0) = 0 and ‖θ∗‖ ≤ η,
we have ‖et‖ ≤ η
√
N = γt2 . In the induction step, we assume
that ‖et‖ ≤ γt2 and show that ‖et+1‖ ≤ γt+12 . By (13), we
have λmin (Jβ,α) ≥ r1. Since we only consider sample paths
on the set defined by (37), we have ‖wt‖ ≤ K(t+1)τ . Then,
from (29), we have
‖et‖ ≤ (1− r1) ‖e‖+ α K
(t+ 1)τ
, (38)
≤ (1− r1) γt
2
+ α
K
(t+ 1)τ
=
γt+1
2
. (39)
From (39), we conclude that, on the set defined by (37), i.e.,
with probability greater than 1 − Ψζ(τ)K2 , ‖et‖ ≤ γt2 for all
t ≥ 0. Then, the false alarm rate of FRDE is upper bounded
by Ψζ(τ)K2 , which establishes (17).
B. Performance with Adversarial Agents
When there are adversarial agents present, the performance
of the FRDE algorithm depends on the strength of the
adversarial and normally behaving agents. Specifically, the
algorithm’s performance depends on the global observability
of the normally behaving agents. If the network of normally
behaving agents is not globally observable, then, the adversar-
ial agents may disrupt the estimation process while evading
detection. We say that a set of adversarial agents A evades
detection by FRDE if the probability of detecting A is no
greater than the false alarm probability of FRDE .
Proposition 1. Let the parameter θ∗ satisfy ‖θ∗‖ < η. If the
network GN of the normally behaving agentsN is not globally
observable, then it is possible for the set of adversarial
agents A to perform an attack (i.e., to send messages to their
neighbors) such that, for some θ 6= θ∗, all n ∈ N , and every
0 ≤ τ0 < 12 ,
P
(
lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
τ0
∥∥xn(t)− θ∥∥ = 0) = 1, (40)
and
P (∃n ∈ N , t ≥ 0 : pin(t) = Attack) ≤ PFA. (41)
where PFA, given in (17), is the false alarm rate of FRDE .
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are not globally observable, then the adversarial agents may
attack the algorithm in a way that simultaneously evades
detection and causes all local estimates to converge to a wrong
parameter, θ, almost surely. Proposition 1 holds even if the
set of adversarial agents, A, does not induce a connected
subgraph GA.
Proof: To prove Proposition 1, we design an attack
that simultaneously evades the distributed attack detection
algorithm and causes the normally behaving agents’ esti-
mates to almost surely converge to an incorrect value. Let
N = {n1, . . . , n|N |}, and letHN = [ HTn1 · · · Hn|N| ]T .
Since the network of normally behaving agents is not globally
observable, we have
HTNHN =
∑
n∈N
HTnHn
is not invertible, which means that there exists a nonzero µ ∈
RM such that
HNµ = 0. (42)
Choose µ ∈ N (HN ) such that
‖θ∗ + µ‖ ≤ η. (43)
Such a choice of µ always exists, since, N (HN ) is a
subspace, ‖θ∗‖ < η (from the statement of Proposition 1), and,
from the triangle inequality, we have ‖θ∗ + µ‖ ≤ ‖θ∗‖+‖µ‖.
Let θ = θ∗ + µ. Recall, from Specification 3, that all
adversarial agents know the value of the parameter θ∗. Let
all adversarial agents n ∈ A participate in the distributed
estimation algorithm as though the true parameter is θ. That is,
an agent n ∈ A, behaves as though its sensor measurement is
yn = Hnθ, (44)
and, otherwise, it follows the initial estimate generation, mes-
sage generation, and estimate update rules of the distributed
estimation algorithm, given by equations (4), (6), and (9),
respectively. Note that this is the same attack strategy as
described in [12], [13].
Consider the scenario in which the true parameter to be
estimated is θ. For all n ∈ N , we have Hnθ = Hnθ∗, since,
by definition, θ− θ∗ ∈ N (HN ). That is, in the scenario that
the true parameter to be estimated is θ, the agents in N make
the same sensor measurements (up to measurement noise) as
in the scenario that the true parameter is θ∗. Thus, the case in
which the true parameter is θ∗ but the set of adversarial agents
behaves as though the true parameter is θ is equivalent to the
case in which the true parameter is θ and all agents behave
normally. Thus, the adversaries probability of being detected is
no greater than the false alarm rate of FRDE . Equation (40)
follows as a consequence of Theorem 1.
We now consider the case when the set of (connected)
uncompromised agents is globally observable. One of two
events must occur: either 1) there exists some uncompromised
agent n ∈ N that raises an alarm flag (pin(t) = Attack), or
2) no uncompromised agent ever raises an alarm flag (i.e., for
all n ∈ N and for all t ≥ 0, pin(t) = No Attack). If event
1) occurs, then, the FRDE successfully detects the presence
of an adversarial agent. If event 2) occurs, then, the FRDE
algorithm has a missed detection. The following theorem states
that, in the case that FRDE misses a detection (event 2), the
local estimates of normally behaving agents are consistent.
Theorem 2. Let the set of normally behaving agents N be
connected, and let GN be globally observable. If, for all n ∈
N and for all t = 0, 1, . . . , we have pin(t) = No Attack, then,
under FRDE , for all n ∈ N , we have
P
(
lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
τ0 ‖xn(t)− θ∗‖ = 0
)
= 1, (45)
for every 0 ≤ τ0 < τ .
Theorem 2 states that when the normally behaving agents are
connected and their models are globally observable, if the
adversarial agents are undetected (for all times t ≥ 0), then,
almost surely, all normally behaving agents’ local estimates
converge asymptotically to θ∗.
For the remainder of this subsection, without loss of gener-
ality, let N = {1, . . . , |N |}, and let A = {|N |+ 1, . . . , N}.6
Let xNt =
[
x1(t)
T · · · x|N |(t)T
]T
, and define the
estimation error of the normally behaving agents as
eNt = x
N
t −
(
1|N | ⊗ θ∗
)
. (46)
To prove Theorem 2, we study the behavior of eNt over time,
and we require the following Lemma, the proof of which is
found in the appendix.
Lemma 6. Let G = (V,E) be a graph, and, for n ∈ V ,
let Hn be the sensing matrix associated with agent n. Let
X = {i1, . . . , i|X |} ⊂ V be a globally observable subset
of agent models ( i.e., the matrix
∑
i∈X H
T
i Hi is invertible)
that induces a connected subgraph GX of G. Suppose that
α, β > 0 are chosen such that
Jβ,α = β (L⊗ IM ) + αDTHDH
is positive definite and satisfies λmax (Jβ,α) ≤ 1. Then, the
matrix
JXβ,α = β (LX ⊗ IM ) + αDXH
T
DXH , (47)
where LX is the graph Laplacian of GX and DXH =
blkdiag
(
Hi1 , . . . ,Hi|X|
)
is also positive definite and satisfies
λmax
(
JXβ,α
)
≤ 1.
We now prove Theorem 2.
Proof (Theorem 2): Consider the update equation of a
normally behaving n ∈ N . For any node n ∈ V , we can
partition the neighborhood of n into ΩNn = Ωn∩N and ΩAn =
Ωn ∩ A. We have
xn(t+ 1) = xn(t)− β
∑
l∈ΩNn
(xn(t)− xl(t))−
β
∑
l∈ΩAn
(
xn(t)−mtl,n
)
+ αHTn (yn(t)−Hnxn(t)) .
(48)
Equation (48) follows from (6) and (9) because all normally
behaving agents follow the prescribed message generation rule
6Although the normally behaving agents n ∈ N are not initially aware of
the members of N and A, for purposes of analysis, we can relabel the agents
arbitrarily without loss of generality.
9while all adversarial agents may send arbitrary messages. The
condition that, for all n ∈ N and for all t, we have pin(t) =
No Attack, implies that for all l ∈ Ωn, we have∥∥xn(t)−mtl,n∥∥ ≤ γt.
Thus, we can rewrite (48) as
xn(t+ 1) = xn(t)− β
∑
l∈ΩNn
(xn(t)− xl(t)) +
αHTn (yn(t)−Hnxn(t)) + δn(t),
(49)
where δn(t) is a bounded disturbance vector that satisfies
‖δn(t)‖ ≤ β |A| γt. (50)
Let
∆Nt =
[
δ1(t)
T · · · δ|N |(t)T
]T
.
From (50), we have∥∥∆Nt ∥∥ ≤ β |A|√|N |γt. (51)
Using (49), we compute the dynamics of xNt as
xNt+1 =
(
I|N |M − β (LN ⊗ IM )
)
xNt + ∆
N
t
+DNH
T (
yNt − αDNH xNt
)
,
(52)
where LN is the Laplacian of the induced subgraph
GN , DNH = blkdiag
(
H1, . . . ,H|N |
)
, and yNt =[
y1(t)
T · · · y|N |(t)T
]T
.
Following the same algebraic manipulations as in the proof
of Theorem 1, we have
eNt+1 =
(
I|N |M − JNβ,α
)
eNt + ∆
N
t + αD
N
H
T
wNt , (53)
where JNβ,α = β (LN ⊗ IM ) + α
(
DNH
TDNH
)
and wNt =[
w1(t)
T · · · w|N |(t)T
]T
. By the triangle inequality we
have∥∥eNt+1∥∥ ≤ ∥∥I|N |M − JNβ,α∥∥∥∥eNt ∥∥+ α ∥∥∥DNH TwNt ∥∥∥+
β |A|
√
|N |γt,
(54)
Note that wNt falls under the purview of Lemma 5. Thus, we
have
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ1
∥∥wNt ∥∥ = 0) = 1, (55)
for every 0 ≤ τ1 < 12 , and, as a consequence of (55), there
exists finite KNw such that
P
(∥∥wNt ∥∥ ≤ KNw(t+ 1)τ1
)
= 1. (56)
Also, note that γt, as defined in (11), falls under the purview
of Lemma 4, so we have
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ2γt = 0, (57)
for every 0 ≤ τ2 < τ . As a consequence of (57), there exists
finite Γ > 0 such that
γt ≤ Γ
(t+ 1)τ2
. (58)
Substituting (56) and (58) into (54), we have, almost surely,
that∥∥eNt+1∥∥ ≤ (1− λmin (JNβ,α)) ∥∥eNt ∥∥+ α KNw(t+ 1)τ1 +
β
|A|√|N |Γ
(t+ 1)τ2
.
(59)
Taking τ1 ≥ τ2 and τ2 arbitrarily close to τ yields∥∥eNt+1∥∥ ≤ (1− λmin (JNβ,α)) ∥∥eNt ∥∥+ c3(t+ 1)τ , (60)
for some c3 > 0. The recurrence relation in (60) falls under
the purview of Lemma 4, which means that
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ0
∥∥eNt ∥∥ = 0. (61)
For any n ∈ N , ‖xn(t)− θ∗‖ ≤
∥∥eNt ∥∥, so (61) estab-
lishes (45).
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We demonstrate the performance of the FRDE algorithm.
The motivation for the numerical examples is as follows.
Consider a network of mobile agents, for example, robots,
whose goal is to determine and arrive at an (initially) unknown
target location. The agents are equipped with sensors to
measure the target location, and all of them can communicate
over a fixed communication graph G. Individual robots do not
know the entire structure of G and instead know only their
local neighborhood in G. The normally behaving robots use
the FRDE algorithm to estimate the location of the target
from their collective measurements and report the presence
of adversarial robots. The adversarial robots attempt to cause
an error in the distributed estimation process while avoiding
detection.
We consider a network of N = 500 agents attempting to
estimate the parameter θ∗ ∈ R3, which corresponds to the x, y,
and z coordinates of the target. For all examples, we consider
the same θ∗: we choose θ∗ (uniformly) at random from a
sphere of radius η = 500 meters. The agents communicate
over a random geometric network, given by Figure 1. We place
Fig. 1: Communication Network of the 500 agents. Agents marked
by black dots measure the x and y coordinates of the target. Agents
marked by red diamonds measure the z coordinate of the target.
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agents uniformly at random over a two dimensional square
(100 meters by 100 meters) and place an edge between agents
whose Euclidean distance is below 10 meters.
We randomly select 160 agents, indicated by the red dia-
monds in Figure 1, to be equipped with sensors that measure
the z component of the target location. For such agents, we
have
HDiamondn =
[
0 0 1
]
.
The remaining agents, indicated by the black dots, are
equipped with sensors that measure the x and y components
of the target location. For such agents, we have
HCirclen =
[
1 0 0
0 1 0
]
.
Additive measurement noise affects all agents’ sensors. The
measurement noise for every agent n, wn(t), is an i.i.d.
sequence of Gaussian random variables with mean 0 and co-
variance σ2Ipn , where pn is the dimension of the measurement
yn(t). For our numerical examples, we use the covariance
value σ2 = 60. The local signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is 11 dB.
The agents perform the algorithm FRDE to estimate θ∗.
For the numerical examples, we assign the value 0 to the
No Attack flag and the value 1 to the Attack flag. We use
Procedure 1 to compute the following parameters for FRDE :
α = 3.1 × 10−2, β = 3.1 × 10−2, r1 = 9.0 × 10−3. These
parameter choices satisfy conditions (12) and (13). We also
choose parameters K = 4 and τ = 0.40.
We consider four different configurations of adversarial
agents:
1) No adversarial agents: All agents behave normally,
2) Strong adversarial agents: All red diamond agents
are adversarial. The remaining normally behaving agent
models are globally unobservable.
3) Disruptive weak adversarial agents: Half of the red
diamond agents are adversarial and perform a disruptive
attack. That is, the adversarial agents attempt to compro-
mise the consistency of the remaining agents’ estimates.
The remaining normally behaving agent models are glob-
ally observable.
4) Undisruptive weak adversarial agents: Half of the red
diamond agents are adversarial and perform a stealthy
attack. That is, the adversarial agents attack the remain-
ing agents so that no agent raises an alarm flag. The
remaining normally behaving agent models are globally
observable.
For each configuration of the adversarial agents, we show how
the local estimates and flag values evolve in time for a single
execution of FRDE .
A. Local Estimate and Flag Value Evolution
Figure 2 describes the performance of FRDE when all
agents behave normally and when all red diamond agents are
adversarial. In the absence of adversarial agents, following
Theorem 1, the local estimates converge to θ∗.
When all 160 red diamond agents are adversarial, the
normally behaving agents induce a connected subgraph but
are not globally observable. Then, following Proposition 1,
Fig. 2: Performance of FRDE when there are no adversarial agents
(left) and when all 160 red diamond agents are adversarial (right).
Top: Agent Estimation Errors. Bottom: Agent Flag Values.
it is possible for the adversarial agents to simultaneously
avoid detection and cause the normally behaving agents to
estimate θ∗ incorrectly. Specifically, the adversarial agents
can behave as though the true parameter was θ∗ + µ, where
µ is an offset in the parameter’s z coordinate that satisfies
‖θ∗ + µ‖ ≤ η. Figure 2 shows that, following the attack
strategy of Proposition 1, the adversarial agents can prevent
the network of agents from converging to the correct estimate
while remaining undetected. As shown by Figure 3, under the
Fig. 3: Performance of FRDE when all 160 red diamond agents are
adversarial: Convergence of estimates to θ∗ + µ.
attack of Proposition 1, the estimates of all agents converge
to the incorrect parameter θ∗ + µ.
In the third and fourth numerical example, we randomly
select 80 out of the 160 red diamond agents to be adversarial.
In these examples, the network of normally behaving agents
is connected and globally observable. First, we consider the
case in which the 80 adversarial agents behave as though
the true parameter was θ∗ + µ. Figure 4 shows that the
adversarial agents are able to prevent the normally behaving
agents’ estimates from converging to the correct value. The
attack, however, causes the normally behaving agents to raise
flags and indicate the presence of an adversarial agent. Thus,
although the agents do not converge to the correct estimate,
the FRDE algorithm allows the normally behaving agents to
correctly detect the presence of an adversarial agent.
In the fourth numerical example, we again consider the case
in which 80 of the 160 red diamond agents are adversarial.
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Fig. 4: Performance of FRDE when 80 out of 160 red diamond
agents are adversarial. Left: Disruptive Attack Right: Undisruptive
attack. Top: Agent Estimation Errors. Bottom: Agent Flag Values.
Although, as previously noted, the normally behaving agent
models in this case are globally observable, it may still be
possible for the adversarial agents to perform an undetectable
attack. To avoid detection, for any agent n ∈ N , for any
l ∈ Ωn, and for all iterations t, the estimate xn(t), must satisfy∥∥∥xn(t)−mtl,n∥∥∥ ≤ γt. That is, to avoid detection, adversarial
agents must attack the network in such a way that no agent’s
estimate deviates too far from the estimates of its neighbors.
Figure 4 shows the effect of an undetectable attack when
the normally behaving agent models are globally observable.
Adversarial agents avoid detection, as no agent raises a flag
indicating the presence of an adversarial agent, but the ad-
versarial agents cannot prevent the normally behaving agents
from converging to the correct estimate of θ∗. The results of
the third and fourth numerical examples verify Theorem 2.
If the network of normally behaving agents is connected
globally observable, and, if the adversarial agents behave in an
undetectable manner, the normally behaving agents’ estimates
converge to the parameter θ∗.
B. Performance Trade-offs
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance trade-offs
for FRDE between the false alarm probability and the de-
viation tolerated in adversarial messages. Specifically, for the
network described by Figure 1, we show how the false alarm
probability bound in (17) and the evolution of the threshold γt
depend on the parameters K and τ (for fixed α, β, and r1). It is
desirable to have both small false aparm probability and small
γt. Having a small γt means that, in order to avoid detection,
adversarial agents may not send messages that deviate too far
from the receiving agents’ estimate. Conversely, having a large
γt allows adversarial agents to send more malicious messages
while evading detection.
Figure 5 shows how changing the choice of K and τ
affect the upper bound on the false alarm rate of FRDE . We
compute the false alarm bound using (17) for different values
of the local noise covariance σ2. The false alarm probability
Fig. 5: Effect of SNR, K, and τ on the bound on the false alarm
probability of FRDE (17).
bound decreases with increasing K and decreasing τ . As we
increase the noise covariance σ2, we require larger K and/or
smaller τ to achieve the same bound on false alarm probability.
The upper bound on false alarm provided by (17) is con-
servative. Figure 5 shows that, for SNR in the 9 to 21 dB
range, we require K values ranging from 1000 to 2000 to
achieve near 0 upper bound on the false alarm probability.
In practice, we can choose K to be much smaller to achieve
low false alarm rates. We compute the empirical false alarm
rates for different SNR as a function of K and τ . Our
simulation considers 4 different SNR (9 dB, 11 dB, 15 dB,
21 dB, corresponding to the SNR considered in Figure 5). We
consider four different values of τ (0.30, 0.35, 0.40, 0.45),
and we consider K in the range from 0 to 8. For each level of
SNR and each setting of τ and K, we run 100 simulations. In
each simulation, we run FRDE for 1500 iterations (with no
adversarial agents), and we report the false alarm rate as the
ratio of the number of simulations in which any agent reports
an adversary to the total number of simulations.
Figure 6 shows the effect of SNR, K, and τ on the empirical
false alarm rate of FRDE . The empirical false alarm rate
Fig. 6: Effect of SNR, K, and τ on empirical false alarm rate of
FRDE .
12
follows the same trends as the upper bound on false alarm
probability from (17). For higher noise covariance (lower
SNR), we require larger K and smaller τ to achieve the same
false alarm rate. The difference between empirical rate and the
upper bound (17), is that we can achieve low false alarm rates
in practice with K ≤ 8. In contrast, to achieve a low upper
bound on false alarm probability, we require K ≥ 1000.
Recall, from (11), a smaller value of K results in a smaller
value of γt. Figure 7 shows how the threshold γt evolves over
time (iterations) for four different choices of K and τ . The
Fig. 7: Effect of K and τ on the bound on the false alarm probability
of FRDE .
evolution of γt does not depend on the noise covariance σ2.
Figure 7 shows that γt decays more quickly for larger τ , and,
for the same value of τ , has smaller value for smaller values
of K. As a consequence Lemma 4, γt goes to 0 eventually
(as t → ∞) for every choice of K > 0 and 0 < τ < 12 .
In practice, however, we are not able to run arbitrarily many
iterations of FRDE , so we are interested in the value of γt
after a finite number of iterations.
To achieve small false alarm probabilities, following Fig-
ures 5 and 6, we require smaller τ and larger K. As Figure 7
shows, smaller τ and larger K yield larger values of γt, which
allows adversarial agents to launch more disruptive attacks
while evading detection. There is a performance trade-off
in FRDE between the algorithm’s false alarm probability and
how disruptive an attack can be before it is detected.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied resilient distributed estimation
of a vector parameter by a network of agents. The true but
unknown parameter is known to belong to a specified compact
subset of a Euclidean space. We have presented an algorithm,
Flag Raising Distributed Estimation (FRDE), that allows a
network of agents to reliably estimate an unknown parameter
in the presence of misbehaving, adversarial agents. Each agent
iteratively updates its own estimate based on its previous
estimate, its noisy sensor measurement of the parameter, and
its neighbors’ estimates. An agent raises a flag to indicate
the presence of an adversarial agent if any of its neighbors
estimates deviates from its own estimate beyond a given
threshold.
Under the global observability condition for the connected
normally behaving agents, if the FRDE algorithm does not
detect an attack, then the normally behaving agents correctly
estimate the target parameter. The false alarm probability of
the algorithm may be arbitrarily small with proper selection
of parameters. We have demonstrated the performance of the
FRDE algorithm through numerical examples. Future work
includes extending FRDE to nonlinear measurement models
and imperfect communication models.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: By inspection, for any α, β > 0, Jβ,α is the sum
of symmetric positive semidefinite matrices, so Jβ,α itself
must be symmetric positive semidefinite. To show its positive
definiteness, we show that µTJβ,αµ 6= 0 for all nonzero
µ ∈ RNM .
We resort to contradiction. Suppose, there exists a nonzero
µ ∈ RNM such that µTJβ,αµ = 0, which means that
µT (L⊗ IM )µ = 0 and µTDTHDHµ = 0. Since, by As-
sumption 3, G is connected, µT (L⊗ IM )µ = 0 implies that
µ = 1N ⊗ µ for some nonzero µ ∈ RM . Then, we have
µTDTHDHµ = µ
T
(
N∑
n=1
HTnHn
)
µ = 0, (62)
for some nonzero µ ∈ RM . This is a contradiction, since, by
Assumption 4, the matrix
∑N
n=0H
T
nHn is invertible. Thus,
we have that the matrix Jβ,α is positive definite.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: In Procedure 1, the auxiliary parameters α̂ and
β̂ are chosen to be any positive values. Following Lemma 1,
Jβ̂,α̂  0, which means that λmax
(
Jβ̂,α̂
)
> 0. Setting α
and β according to (14) ensures that λmax (Jβ,α) = 1 and
0 < λmin (Jβ,α) ≤ 1.
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: For κ > λmin(G)λ2(L) , let J
′
κ = κ (L⊗ IM ) +DTHDH .
We find a lower bound on λmin
(
J
′
κ
)
. The minimum eigen-
value satisfies [32]
λmin
(
J
′
κ
)
= min zTJ
′
κz.
s.t. ‖z‖ = 1
(63)
Define the subspace
C =
{
v ∈ RNM
∣∣∣v = 1N ⊗ u, u ∈ RM} , (64)
and let C⊥ be the subspace orthogonal to C. The subspace C
is in the null space of L⊗ IM . For any, v ∈ C with ‖v‖ = 1,
we can write v as v = 1N⊗u√
N
for some u ∈ RM with ‖u‖ = 1.
Then, we can write any z ∈ RNM with ‖z‖ as
z = b
1N ⊗ u√
N
+ w, (65)
where b2 ≤ 1, ‖u‖ = 1, w ∈ C⊥, and ‖w‖2 = 1− b2.
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From (63), we have
λmin
(
J
′
κ
)
≥ wT (κ (L⊗ IM ) +DTHDH)w+
b2
N
(1N ⊗ u)T DTHDH (1N ⊗ u) +
2b√
N
(1N ⊗ u)T DTHDHw,
(66)
≥ λ2 (L)κ(1− b2)− 2
∣∣∣∣〈w, bDTHDH (1N ⊗ u)√N
〉∣∣∣∣+
b2λmin (G) .
(67)
To derive (67) from (66), we have used the fact that
b2
N
(1N ⊗ u)T DTHDH (1N ⊗ u) = b2uTGu. (68)
From (68) and the Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality, we have∣∣∣∣〈w, bDTHDH (1N ⊗ u)√N
〉∣∣∣∣ ≤√‖w‖2 b2uTGu, (69)
=
√
λmin (G) b2 (1− b2). (70)
Define the functions f1(s), f2(s) as
f1(s) = κλ2(L)(1− s) + λmin(G)s, (71)
f2(s) = f1(s)− 2
√
λmin(G)s(1− s). (72)
Substituting (70) into (67), we have
λmin
(
J
′
κ
)
≥ f2
(
b2
)
. (73)
We now minimize f2(s), which has first derivative
df2
ds
= λmin(G)− κλ2(L)− λmin(G)(1− 2s)√
λmin(G)s(1− s)
, (74)
and second derivative
d2f2
ds2
=
√
λmin(G)
2(s− s2) . (75)
For 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, d2fds2 ≥ 0, so f2(s) is convex and minimized
for the value of s such that df2ds = 0 for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. When
κ ≥ λmin(G)λ2(L) ,
df2
ds = 0 at
s =
1
2
+
1
2
√
(λmin (G)− κλ2 (L))2
4λmin (G) + (λmin (G)− κλ2 (L))2
. (76)
By Assumption 4, λmin(G) > 0, so, following (76), the
minimizing s is less than 1. Note that, for 0 ≤ s < 1 and
κ > λmin(G)λ2(L) , we have f1(s) > λmin (G). Substituting (76) and
f1(s) > λmin (G) into (72) and (73), we have, after algebraic
manipulations
λmin
(
J
′
κ
)
> λmin (G)−
4λmin (G)√
4λmin (G) + (λmin (G)− λ2 (L)κ)2
(77)
Consider the parameters α, β, and r1 selected following
Procedure 2. We first show that λmax (Jβ,α) ≤ 1. Let κ1 be
selected according to Step 1) of Procedure 2. Then, we have
κ1 =
β
α , and Jβ,α = αJ
′
κ1 . The maximum eigenvalue of of
J
′
κ1 satisfies
λmax
(
J
′
κ1
)
≤ κ1λmax (L) + λmax
(
DTHDH
)
. (78)
As a consequence of Assumption 2, λmax
(
DTHDH
) ≤ N .
From (78), we see that choosing α according to Procedure 2
ensures that λmax (Jβ,α) ≤ 1.
We now show that 0 < r1 ≤ λmin (Jβ,α). As a con-
sequence of Assumption 2, we have λmin(G) ≤ 1. By
algebraic manipulation, the selection of κ1 in Step 1) (κ1 >
1
λ2(L)
(
λmin(G) + 2
√
4− λmin(G)
)
) ensures that r1 > 0.
Since Jβ,α = αJ
′
κ1 , we have λmin (Jβ,α) = αλmin
(
J
′
κ1
)
.
Note that the right hand side of (77) is equal to r1α . Thus,
from (77), we have r1 ≤ λmin (Jβ,α).
D. Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: Define the process {Vt} as
Vt =
(
t
t+ 1
)1−τ0
Vt−1 +
1
(t+ 1)1−τ0
wt,
V0 = m0 = w0.
(79)
for 0 ≤ τ0 < 12 . Note that Vt = (t + 1)τ0mt. Define the
process
{
V˜t
}
as
V˜t = ‖Vt‖2 +
∞∑
j=t+1
trace (Σ)
(j + 1)2(1−τ0)
. (80)
By definition, V˜t ≥ 0. We now show that
{
V˜t
}
is a super-
martingale.
Substituting (79) into (80) and performing algebraic manip-
ulations, we have
V˜t+1 =
‖wt+1‖2 + 2wTt+1Vt(t+ 1)1−τ0
(t+ 2)2(1−τ0)
+
‖Vt‖2
(
t+ 1
t+ 2
)2(1−τ0)
+
∞∑
j=t+2
trace (Σ)
(j + 1)2(1−τ0)
.
(81)
The processes Vt and V˜t depend only on w0, . . . , wt, which
means that wt+1 is independent of V0, . . . , Vt and V˜0, . . . , V˜t.
From (80), we also have
E
[
‖Vt‖2
∣∣∣V˜0, . . . , V˜t] = ‖Vt‖2 . (82)
Taking the expectation of (81) conditioned on V˜0, . . . , V˜t, we
have
E
[
V˜t+1
∣∣∣V˜0, . . . , V˜t] = trace (Σ)
(t+ 2)2(1−τ0)
+
‖Vt‖2
(
t+ 1
t+ 2
)2(1−τ0)
+
∞∑
j=t+2
trace (Σ)
(j + 1)2(1−τ0)
,
(83)
≤ ‖Vt‖2 +
∞∑
j=t+1
trace (Σ)
(j + 1)2(1−τ0)
= V˜t, (84)
where (84) follows from (83) since
(
t+1
t+2
)2(1−τ0) ≤ 1.
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First, we prove (22). Since
{
V˜t
}
is a nonnegative super-
martingale, it converges almost surely to a finite, nonnegative
random variable V ∗, i.e.
lim
t→∞ V˜t = V
∗ a.s.. (85)
Since limt→∞
∑∞
j=t+1
trace(Σ)
(j+1)2(1−τ0) = 0, from (80), we also
have
lim
t→∞ ‖Vt‖
2
= V ∗ a.s.. (86)
For a finite, nonnegative random variable V ∗, we have V ∗ =
0 a.s. if and only if E [V ∗] = 0. By Fatou’s Lemma, we have
E [V ∗] ≤ lim inf
t→∞ E
[
‖Vt‖2
]
. (87)
To evaluate the right hand side of (87), note that ‖Vt‖2 =
(1 + t)
τ0 ‖mt‖2. From (21), we can express E
[
‖mt+1‖2
]
as
E
[
‖mt+1‖2
]
= E
[∥∥∥∥(1− 1t+ 1
)
mt +
wt+1
t+ 1
∥∥∥∥2
]
, (88)
=
(
1− 1
t+ 1
)2
E
[
‖mt‖2
]
+
1
(t+ 1)2
E
[
‖wt+1‖2
]
, (89)
=
(
1−
(
2
t+ 1
− 1
(t+ 1)2
))
E
[
‖mt‖2
]
+
trace (Σ)
(t+ 1)2
, (90)
≤
(
1− 1
t+ 1
)
E
[
‖mt‖2
]
+
trace (Σ)
(t+ 1)2
, (91)
where (89) follows from (88) since wt+1 is independent of mt,
and (91) follows from (90) since (t + 1)−1 ≤ 2(t + 1)−1 −
(t+ 1)−2 for all t ≥ 0. Relation (91) falls under the purview
of Lemma 4, which means that
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
2τ0E
[
‖mt‖2
]
= 0. (92)
Since ‖Vt‖ = (1 + t)τ0 ‖mt‖, and since V ∗ ≥ 0, combin-
ing (86) with (92) yields
E [V ∗] = 0, (93)
which means that V ∗ = 0 a.s.. That is, ‖Vt‖2, converges to 0
almost surely. Substituting ‖Vt‖ = (1 + t)τ0 ‖mt‖, we have
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ0 ‖mt‖ = 0
)
= 1, (94)
for every 0 ≤ τ0 < 12 , which shows (22).
Second, we prove (23). By (84), we have that
{
V˜t
}
is a
nonnegative supermartingale. Then, by the maximal inequality
for nonnegative supermartingales [33], we have, for any k > 0,
P
(
sup
t≥0
V˜t > k
2
)
≤ 1
k2
E
[
V˜0
]
. (95)
From (79) and (80), we have
E
[
V˜0
]
= E
[
‖V0‖2
]
+
∞∑
j=2
trace (Σ)
j2(1−τ0)
, (96)
=
∞∑
j=1
trace (Σ)
j2(1−τ0)
, (97)
where (97) follows from (96) since V0 = m0 = w0 and
E
[
‖w0‖2
]
= trace (Σ).
From (80), we have ‖Vt‖2 ≤ V˜t, and, from (79), we have
‖Vt‖2 = (1 + t)2τ0 ‖mt‖2. Thus, we have
P
(
sup
t≥0
V˜t > k
2
)
≥ P
(
sup
t≥0
(t+ 1)2τ0 ‖mt‖2 > k2
)
. (98)
Combining (95), (97), and (98), we have, after algebraic
manipulations
P
(
sup
t≥0
‖mt‖2 > k
(t+ 1)τ0
)
≤ 1
k2
∞∑
j=1
trace (Σ)
j2(1−τ0)
, (99)
which establishes (23).
E. Proof of Lemma 6
Proof: First, we show that JXβ,α is positive definite. Since
β, α > 0, the graph GX is connected, and X is globally
observable, Lemma 1 applies, and, we have that the matrix
JXβ,α is positive definite.
Second, we show that λmax
(
JXβ,α
)
≤ 1. Without loss of
generality, let X = {1, . . . , |X |} , and let Y = V \ X . Then,
we can partition the matrix Jβ,α as
Jβ,α =
[
J˜Xβ,α
(
K1β,α
)T
K1β,α K
2
β,α
]
, (100)
where
J˜Xβ,α = J
X
β,α + β (ΣX ,Y ⊗ IM ) . (101)
We show that λmax
(
J˜Xβ,α
)
≤ 1. For purposes of contradiction,
suppose that λmax
(
J˜Xβ,α
)
> 1, and let v be the associated
eigenvector. Thus, we have√
vT J˜Xβ,α
T
J˜Xβ,α v = λmax
(
J˜Xβ,α
)
‖v‖ > ‖v‖ . (102)
By definition, we have
λmax
(
J˜β,α
)
= sup
v∈RNM
∥∥∥J˜β,αv∥∥∥
‖v‖ . (103)
Consider v˜ =
[
vT 0T(N−|X|)M
]T
. For the vector v˜ ∈
RNM , we have
‖Jβ,αv˜‖ =
√
vT
(
J˜Xβ,α
T
J˜Xβ,α +K
1
β,α
T
K1β,α
)
v, (104)
≥
√
vT
(
J˜Xβ,α
T
J˜Xβ,α
)
v, (105)
where (105) follows from (104) because the matrix
K1β,α
T
K1β,α is positive semidefinite. Then, substituting
for (102), we have
‖Jβ,αv˜‖
‖v˜‖ ≥
∥∥∥J˜Xβ,αv∥∥∥
‖v‖ = λmax
(
J˜Xβ,α
)
> 1. (106)
From (103) and (106), we have λmax (Jβ,α) > 1, which is a
contradiction since α, β are chosen such that λmax (Jβ,α) ≤ 1.
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Thus, we have λmax
(
J˜Xβ,α
)
≤ 1 as well. Applying Weyl’s
Inequality [34] to (101), we have
λmax
(
JXβ,α
)
+ λmin (β (ΣX ,Y ⊗ IM )) ≤ λmax
(
J˜Xβ,α
)
.
(107)
By definition, ΣX ,Y  0, so λmin (β (ΣX ,Y ⊗ IM )) ≥ 0.
Then, from (107), we have λmax
(
JXβ,α
)
≤ 1.
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